The Meaning of a Sensation Term is not a Private Object the Term Picks Out.
Phil 311
Wittgenstein
The Meaning of a Sensation Term is not a Private Object the Term Picks Out.
Peter Fogarty
2/10/95
I
The thesis, that the meaning of a sensation term is not a private object the term picks out, is difficult to interpret. A sensation is something that only you can feel or sense. It is highly individual, like pain. A sensation term is a term representing a sensation; the name given to a sensation. A private object is something that only you have access to. Your sensation of pain is one such private object. Therefore, the thesis can be read as saying that the meaning of pain does not lie in our personal sensation of pain. My personal sensation of pain is something that only I can know and understand. A private language is a language only the speaker can speak and understand. It could be used to refer to my sensation of pain. The thesis claims that we cannot have a private language. We can talk about our personal sensations; but not through a private language. The strongest argument for the thesis is that we cannot have a private language without fixing meaning through a public language. The most powerful objection to the thesis is that we refer to our private sensations to understand public sensation terms. The thesis is relevant to the materialist theory of consciousness in the contemporary philosophy of mind. It can eliminate the qualia objection to the materialist view of consciousness.
II
The thesis, that the meaning of a sensation term is not a private object the term picks out, is a statement against the possibility of having a private language. A private language, according to Wittgenstein, is distinct from a public language; which everyone understands and has access to; in that only the speaker can speak and understand her/his speech. It is not a language that is derived from a public language; for then it would not be private. It is a language that cannot be translated. Such language is untranslatable because the words of this language "refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations"(243). Hence, the content and context of a private language can only be understood by the individual to whom it belongs. The meaning of its terms are untranslatable because only the individual can know what they mean. As Wittgenstein says, "another person cannot understand the language"(243). The terms of a private language are necessarily incomprehensible to another person because of the fact that they cannot experience the same sensations or know the same objects as the owner of the language.
Thus, to say that the meaning of a sensation term is not a private object the term picks out, is to say that we cannot have private language. A sensation is a private thing; nobody can experience the exact same sensation as another. If private language is possible, then the meaning of the term used to describe a sensation would be fixed in that private object that is the sensation. Every private object would have a term to describe it; a term that is understood only by the individual to whom the language belongs. By stating that the meaning of a sensation term does not lie in a private object, the concept of private language is rejected.
III
The need to fix meaning forms the strongest argument for the thesis against the possibility of private language. Wittgenstein illustrates this strongly and clearly in his argument against the possibility of fixing the meaning of sensation terms in a private object. Each argument against private language returns to the need to fix the meaning of sensation terms in a public language. This must be done otherwise the private language is rendered irrelevant; as Wittgenstein states, sarcastically, I imagine: "The proposition 'Sensations are private' is comparable to 'One plays patience by oneself'"(248). This truth reveals the futility behind the quest for a private language. A private language, is by definition, comparable to a game of patience. The only person we can speak a private language with is ourselves. A private language can only give satisfaction to the speaker. Patience is played when the player has nothing better to do. Why should the speaker bother speaking when nobody else can understand her/his spoken private language? The private language is thus rendered irrelevant because it is not communicable.
Wittgenstein, however, destroys the case for the private language much more thoroughly than this. He attempts to build his own private language from the basics. He begins by examining what a sensation term is. They are possibly just words "connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions of the sensation and used in their place"(244). Wittgenstein eliminates the trap of description by saying that these sensation terms do not describe the sensation; but replace it by verbal expression. Sensation terms are therefore from the beginning, public. They are public because they are taught; sensation terms, Wittgenstein says, come from ostensive definition. This is only a possible interpretation; the benefit of the doubt needs to be given to this.
IV
Next, Wittgenstein asks of himself; "in what sense are my sensations private?"(246). Here he addresses the most powerful objection to the thesis. The objection is that sensations are private because nobody can know what someone else's sensation of pain is like and how it is similar or different from his/her own sensation of pain. One's only reference is to one's own pain. The private language argument depends on the meaning of sensation terms being private. If nobody can know another's pain, then the definition of pain cannot be fixed. Yet we still speak of having pain, of sharing pain. We are able to communicate our intensely private sensation of pain in a public sense. We are able to come to a consensus of what constitutes pain.
People are intrigued by the private language argument because they feel that nobody else can know their feelings and sensations. It is seductive because our sensations are private and it is impossible to communicate how it feels to have the sensation, to describe it exactly, to make the listener experience our sensations. It leads us towards the belief that we have a private language. This is the strongest objection to the thesis: that we refer to private sensations to understand public language and we refer to our private sensations with a private language. The advocates for this objection will disagree primarily with the conclusion that the meaning of a sensation term must necessarily be fixed in a public language in order for the speaker to communicate that sensation. It is however, a fundamentally flawed objection as Wittgenstein proves.
The private language advocate can reply to Wittgenstein that he is right; we use concepts and expressions that are understandable to others to communicate a sense of pain; yet we can find meaning in the sensation term for pain in our own personal experience of pain. This objection is almost beside the point. Remember, a private language refers to what can only be known by the individual speaking. By Wittgenstein's definition of what constitutes a private language; the meaning of a public term cannot be a private sensation. As Wittgenstein says: "in so far as it makes sense to say that my pain is the same as his, it is also possible for us both to have the same pain"(253). If two people can compare their pains and agree that they are the same and the while retain a private understanding that their private pain is different, they are saying that their pains are similar. In any case, if the meaning of pain was private, they would not be able to compare their pains; each having a different conception of what constitutes pain.
V
Wittgenstein attempts to reconcile these two arguments. He tries to "shew the fly the way out of the [private language] fly-bottle"(309), to show the private language advocate their error. He attempts to build his own private language. Wittgenstein's eventual conclusion is that a private language is not functional. I will explain his argument in more depth.
Returning to Wittgenstein's interpretation of sensation terms; the ability to communicate pain is understandable because it derives from a public conception of pain. If these sensation terms were natural expressions of sensations, his language would not be private because these expressions would clearly be understandable; being public. But, Wittgenstein notes, sensation terms are not necessarily natural. If there were no natural expression for pain, no groaning or grimacing, it would then become "impossible to teach . . . the use of the word"(257) that matches the sensation; if there ever was such a word. In such a case, the sensation might have a name invented for it; but because the sensation of pain is not obvious to others, it becomes impossible to communicate it. (How can someone with an impassive expression on their face communicate their blinding headache; something that they have never heard of, nor experienced, when there are no visual clues to alert other people to the existence of pain?).
Wittgenstein builds his definitions of the terms and limits of the private language argument by beginning with their foundation; sensations, and building up to sensation terms. But here, he is struck by an impasse: how could the sufferer of the sensation of pain have named it? This question illustrates the need to have a purpose for naming a sensation that is not shared. Why is there a need to name the sensation if it cannot be communicated? To give something a name without understanding why they have named it is a pointless action. To create a sensation term presupposes a public understanding of the term; which means that it cannot be a private object. How can the private sufferer of pain give it a name without privately understanding the reason for giving it a name? To give something a name is to place it in context; as Wittgenstein says: "it shews the post where the new word is stationed"(257). Hence, the existence of a private grammar must be presupposed. A private grammar is necessary to place the name in its context in a private language.
Wittgenstein's attempt at the construction of a private language fails because of insufficient stage-setting. This is clearly demonstrated in his diary example. Wittgenstein's diary example shows how giving a sensation a name without context becomes futile. Wittgenstein decides to keep a diary of a recurrent sensation that he feels; to which he gives the sign 'S'. The sensation, Wittgenstein says, is indefinable, but he can "concentrate [his] attention on the sensation - and so, as it were, point to it inwardly"(258). By this, Wittgenstein refuses to publicly define his sensation; the only sign of his holding that sensation is the moment at which he marks in his diary the day during which he had 'S'. He defines the sensation internally, by impressing it on himself; by saying 'I am feeling "S" right now', thus marking the connection between the sensation and the sign. The sensation is relevant only to Wittgenstein; only he can say whether he is correct in identifying subsequent sensations as 'S'. Wittgenstein remarks on the keeping of the diary as merely a ceremony, for it does nothing and accomplishes nothing for anyone else.
Wittgenstein elaborates that it is necessary to remember that the words that he has used in creating this example of the use of a private language come from a public language: "'sensation' is a word of our common language, not of one intelligible to me alone"(261). The use of these words within a public language stand in need of a justification of their meaning in the public language. The meaning of the sensation term, 'S' is not fixed in the private object that Wittgenstein designated as representing 'S'. 'S' must be defined in the public language for the diary experiment to make sense. Also, Wittgenstein charges that there is no feeling of "pointing-into yourself, which often accompanies 'naming the sensation' when one is thinking about 'private language'"(275). We live everyday without considering that what we see and feel are unique to ourselves; this is because we think in a public language, where we accept that our sensations and feelings, if not the same, are shared. The private object that represents the blue sky, our pains, cannot provide the meaning for sensation terms. What does represent the meaning of sensation terms is a gestalt of private and public understanding of the sensation the term represents.
We communicate our sensations through sensation terms. The meaning of these sensation terms cannot lie in a private language. By the definition of private language, they are not be communicable. To communicate a sensation; a public term must be used. The meaning of a sensation term cannot be a private object that the term picks out. It must always be fixed in a public object; otherwise the sensation term becomes irrelevant. Private language fails because of the constant need to fix its meanings with regard to a public language.
VI
Wittgenstein's thesis is supported by contemporary philosophy of mind. In contemporary philosophy of mind; materialism is the only game in town. Even a light reading of Wittgenstein confirms him as a hardened materialist. An objection to the materialist presentation of consciousness is from the position of qualia. Qualia is a subjective theory. The advocates for qualia claim that consciousness can never be defined physically, that there is another, inexplicable side to our mental states. This is as opposed to the materialist view that consciousness can be and will be fully understood. A Neo-Wittgenstein argument against qualia will eliminate the qualia objection to the materialist view of consciousness, by the same criteria by which Dennett sniffs: "they just aren't functional"(404) and dismisses Jackson's epiphenomenal qualia.
This contemporary theory is relevant to the examination of the thesis because both are similar problems. Both are reliant on what cannot quite be defined. Qualia and sensations are names for related mental states, if they are not the same thing. We cannot know another person's qualia just as we cannot know another person's sensations. Qualia is the Latin for qualities. In philosophy it is the qualities of experience that are under discussion. Personal experience, strictly speaking, is a private object. It includes sensations. The problems of qualia and private language are similar in that they are both internally located. A private language is possible just as epiphenonemal qualia are possible; it's just that both are non-functional. Both have no real effect on the world. Frank Jackson's interpretation of epiphenomenal qualia is that "certain properties of certain mental states, namely these . . . called qualia, are such that their possession or absence makes no difference to the physical world" but the "instantiation of qualia makes a difference to other mental states, though not to anything physical"(133). This sounds familiar. Although the analogy is not perfect, in that sensations do make a difference in the physical world, a private language does make no difference to the physical world and it would make a difference to other mental states. Wittgenstein does not directly say this, but implies it when he says: "One plays patience by oneself"(248).
Wittgenstein's argument against private language works just as well against epiphenomenal qualia if we consider it as an inclusive sensation term. A neo-Wittgenstein argument will consider that epiphenomenal qualia is a collective term for sensations. It would then deconstruct it in the same way as I have described previously; reaching the conclusion that although epiphenomenal qualia are private, they are discussed in a public language and therefore do not constitute a private language. As I have said, the analogy is imperfect, but this relevant because it is a new materialist reply against qualia.
VII
Wittgenstein effectively removes the foundation stone of the old Seventeenth and Eighteenth century models of language, at the same time rejecting the idea of private language as being inconsequential with the thesis: that the meaning of a sensation is not a private object the term picks out. This thesis eliminates the relevance of having private language by removing the meaning of sensation terms from private objects that the term represents. What does represent the meaning of the sensation term is a gestalt of private and public understanding of the sensation the term represents. Wittgenstein shows that all private language arguments fail because the meaning of their terms need to be fixed in a public language. This is the strongest argument for the thesis. The main objection to the thesis is that we look to our private sensations to understand the meaning of public sensation terms. Wittgenstein, however, shows us that our understanding of these sensation terms is based on a public consensus on their meaning. The thesis indirectly rejects the qualia objection to the materialist view of consciousness in contemporary philosophy of mind by asserting that, as a private language is non-functional, qualia is non-functional because they are not relevant to the physical world. We may have them, but they don't do anything relevant. "So", Wittgenstein says, "in the end when one is doing philosophy one gets to the point where one would like to just emit an inarticulate sound"(261).
Bibliography
* Brown, Derek. PHIL 311 Lectures 1995
* Dennett, Daniel. Consciousness Explained. (Penguin; Auckland, 1991).
* Jackson, Frank. Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly. 1982. (127-136).
* Proudfoot, Diane. PHIL 311 Lectures 1995
* Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. (Oxford; Blackwell, 1992). (paras: 243-308).
Wittgenstein
The Meaning of a Sensation Term is not a Private Object the Term Picks Out.
Peter Fogarty
2/10/95
I
The thesis, that the meaning of a sensation term is not a private object the term picks out, is difficult to interpret. A sensation is something that only you can feel or sense. It is highly individual, like pain. A sensation term is a term representing a sensation; the name given to a sensation. A private object is something that only you have access to. Your sensation of pain is one such private object. Therefore, the thesis can be read as saying that the meaning of pain does not lie in our personal sensation of pain. My personal sensation of pain is something that only I can know and understand. A private language is a language only the speaker can speak and understand. It could be used to refer to my sensation of pain. The thesis claims that we cannot have a private language. We can talk about our personal sensations; but not through a private language. The strongest argument for the thesis is that we cannot have a private language without fixing meaning through a public language. The most powerful objection to the thesis is that we refer to our private sensations to understand public sensation terms. The thesis is relevant to the materialist theory of consciousness in the contemporary philosophy of mind. It can eliminate the qualia objection to the materialist view of consciousness.
II
The thesis, that the meaning of a sensation term is not a private object the term picks out, is a statement against the possibility of having a private language. A private language, according to Wittgenstein, is distinct from a public language; which everyone understands and has access to; in that only the speaker can speak and understand her/his speech. It is not a language that is derived from a public language; for then it would not be private. It is a language that cannot be translated. Such language is untranslatable because the words of this language "refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations"(243). Hence, the content and context of a private language can only be understood by the individual to whom it belongs. The meaning of its terms are untranslatable because only the individual can know what they mean. As Wittgenstein says, "another person cannot understand the language"(243). The terms of a private language are necessarily incomprehensible to another person because of the fact that they cannot experience the same sensations or know the same objects as the owner of the language.
Thus, to say that the meaning of a sensation term is not a private object the term picks out, is to say that we cannot have private language. A sensation is a private thing; nobody can experience the exact same sensation as another. If private language is possible, then the meaning of the term used to describe a sensation would be fixed in that private object that is the sensation. Every private object would have a term to describe it; a term that is understood only by the individual to whom the language belongs. By stating that the meaning of a sensation term does not lie in a private object, the concept of private language is rejected.
III
The need to fix meaning forms the strongest argument for the thesis against the possibility of private language. Wittgenstein illustrates this strongly and clearly in his argument against the possibility of fixing the meaning of sensation terms in a private object. Each argument against private language returns to the need to fix the meaning of sensation terms in a public language. This must be done otherwise the private language is rendered irrelevant; as Wittgenstein states, sarcastically, I imagine: "The proposition 'Sensations are private' is comparable to 'One plays patience by oneself'"(248). This truth reveals the futility behind the quest for a private language. A private language, is by definition, comparable to a game of patience. The only person we can speak a private language with is ourselves. A private language can only give satisfaction to the speaker. Patience is played when the player has nothing better to do. Why should the speaker bother speaking when nobody else can understand her/his spoken private language? The private language is thus rendered irrelevant because it is not communicable.
Wittgenstein, however, destroys the case for the private language much more thoroughly than this. He attempts to build his own private language from the basics. He begins by examining what a sensation term is. They are possibly just words "connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions of the sensation and used in their place"(244). Wittgenstein eliminates the trap of description by saying that these sensation terms do not describe the sensation; but replace it by verbal expression. Sensation terms are therefore from the beginning, public. They are public because they are taught; sensation terms, Wittgenstein says, come from ostensive definition. This is only a possible interpretation; the benefit of the doubt needs to be given to this.
IV
Next, Wittgenstein asks of himself; "in what sense are my sensations private?"(246). Here he addresses the most powerful objection to the thesis. The objection is that sensations are private because nobody can know what someone else's sensation of pain is like and how it is similar or different from his/her own sensation of pain. One's only reference is to one's own pain. The private language argument depends on the meaning of sensation terms being private. If nobody can know another's pain, then the definition of pain cannot be fixed. Yet we still speak of having pain, of sharing pain. We are able to communicate our intensely private sensation of pain in a public sense. We are able to come to a consensus of what constitutes pain.
People are intrigued by the private language argument because they feel that nobody else can know their feelings and sensations. It is seductive because our sensations are private and it is impossible to communicate how it feels to have the sensation, to describe it exactly, to make the listener experience our sensations. It leads us towards the belief that we have a private language. This is the strongest objection to the thesis: that we refer to private sensations to understand public language and we refer to our private sensations with a private language. The advocates for this objection will disagree primarily with the conclusion that the meaning of a sensation term must necessarily be fixed in a public language in order for the speaker to communicate that sensation. It is however, a fundamentally flawed objection as Wittgenstein proves.
The private language advocate can reply to Wittgenstein that he is right; we use concepts and expressions that are understandable to others to communicate a sense of pain; yet we can find meaning in the sensation term for pain in our own personal experience of pain. This objection is almost beside the point. Remember, a private language refers to what can only be known by the individual speaking. By Wittgenstein's definition of what constitutes a private language; the meaning of a public term cannot be a private sensation. As Wittgenstein says: "in so far as it makes sense to say that my pain is the same as his, it is also possible for us both to have the same pain"(253). If two people can compare their pains and agree that they are the same and the while retain a private understanding that their private pain is different, they are saying that their pains are similar. In any case, if the meaning of pain was private, they would not be able to compare their pains; each having a different conception of what constitutes pain.
V
Wittgenstein attempts to reconcile these two arguments. He tries to "shew the fly the way out of the [private language] fly-bottle"(309), to show the private language advocate their error. He attempts to build his own private language. Wittgenstein's eventual conclusion is that a private language is not functional. I will explain his argument in more depth.
Returning to Wittgenstein's interpretation of sensation terms; the ability to communicate pain is understandable because it derives from a public conception of pain. If these sensation terms were natural expressions of sensations, his language would not be private because these expressions would clearly be understandable; being public. But, Wittgenstein notes, sensation terms are not necessarily natural. If there were no natural expression for pain, no groaning or grimacing, it would then become "impossible to teach . . . the use of the word"(257) that matches the sensation; if there ever was such a word. In such a case, the sensation might have a name invented for it; but because the sensation of pain is not obvious to others, it becomes impossible to communicate it. (How can someone with an impassive expression on their face communicate their blinding headache; something that they have never heard of, nor experienced, when there are no visual clues to alert other people to the existence of pain?).
Wittgenstein builds his definitions of the terms and limits of the private language argument by beginning with their foundation; sensations, and building up to sensation terms. But here, he is struck by an impasse: how could the sufferer of the sensation of pain have named it? This question illustrates the need to have a purpose for naming a sensation that is not shared. Why is there a need to name the sensation if it cannot be communicated? To give something a name without understanding why they have named it is a pointless action. To create a sensation term presupposes a public understanding of the term; which means that it cannot be a private object. How can the private sufferer of pain give it a name without privately understanding the reason for giving it a name? To give something a name is to place it in context; as Wittgenstein says: "it shews the post where the new word is stationed"(257). Hence, the existence of a private grammar must be presupposed. A private grammar is necessary to place the name in its context in a private language.
Wittgenstein's attempt at the construction of a private language fails because of insufficient stage-setting. This is clearly demonstrated in his diary example. Wittgenstein's diary example shows how giving a sensation a name without context becomes futile. Wittgenstein decides to keep a diary of a recurrent sensation that he feels; to which he gives the sign 'S'. The sensation, Wittgenstein says, is indefinable, but he can "concentrate [his] attention on the sensation - and so, as it were, point to it inwardly"(258). By this, Wittgenstein refuses to publicly define his sensation; the only sign of his holding that sensation is the moment at which he marks in his diary the day during which he had 'S'. He defines the sensation internally, by impressing it on himself; by saying 'I am feeling "S" right now', thus marking the connection between the sensation and the sign. The sensation is relevant only to Wittgenstein; only he can say whether he is correct in identifying subsequent sensations as 'S'. Wittgenstein remarks on the keeping of the diary as merely a ceremony, for it does nothing and accomplishes nothing for anyone else.
Wittgenstein elaborates that it is necessary to remember that the words that he has used in creating this example of the use of a private language come from a public language: "'sensation' is a word of our common language, not of one intelligible to me alone"(261). The use of these words within a public language stand in need of a justification of their meaning in the public language. The meaning of the sensation term, 'S' is not fixed in the private object that Wittgenstein designated as representing 'S'. 'S' must be defined in the public language for the diary experiment to make sense. Also, Wittgenstein charges that there is no feeling of "pointing-into yourself, which often accompanies 'naming the sensation' when one is thinking about 'private language'"(275). We live everyday without considering that what we see and feel are unique to ourselves; this is because we think in a public language, where we accept that our sensations and feelings, if not the same, are shared. The private object that represents the blue sky, our pains, cannot provide the meaning for sensation terms. What does represent the meaning of sensation terms is a gestalt of private and public understanding of the sensation the term represents.
We communicate our sensations through sensation terms. The meaning of these sensation terms cannot lie in a private language. By the definition of private language, they are not be communicable. To communicate a sensation; a public term must be used. The meaning of a sensation term cannot be a private object that the term picks out. It must always be fixed in a public object; otherwise the sensation term becomes irrelevant. Private language fails because of the constant need to fix its meanings with regard to a public language.
VI
Wittgenstein's thesis is supported by contemporary philosophy of mind. In contemporary philosophy of mind; materialism is the only game in town. Even a light reading of Wittgenstein confirms him as a hardened materialist. An objection to the materialist presentation of consciousness is from the position of qualia. Qualia is a subjective theory. The advocates for qualia claim that consciousness can never be defined physically, that there is another, inexplicable side to our mental states. This is as opposed to the materialist view that consciousness can be and will be fully understood. A Neo-Wittgenstein argument against qualia will eliminate the qualia objection to the materialist view of consciousness, by the same criteria by which Dennett sniffs: "they just aren't functional"(404) and dismisses Jackson's epiphenomenal qualia.
This contemporary theory is relevant to the examination of the thesis because both are similar problems. Both are reliant on what cannot quite be defined. Qualia and sensations are names for related mental states, if they are not the same thing. We cannot know another person's qualia just as we cannot know another person's sensations. Qualia is the Latin for qualities. In philosophy it is the qualities of experience that are under discussion. Personal experience, strictly speaking, is a private object. It includes sensations. The problems of qualia and private language are similar in that they are both internally located. A private language is possible just as epiphenonemal qualia are possible; it's just that both are non-functional. Both have no real effect on the world. Frank Jackson's interpretation of epiphenomenal qualia is that "certain properties of certain mental states, namely these . . . called qualia, are such that their possession or absence makes no difference to the physical world" but the "instantiation of qualia makes a difference to other mental states, though not to anything physical"(133). This sounds familiar. Although the analogy is not perfect, in that sensations do make a difference in the physical world, a private language does make no difference to the physical world and it would make a difference to other mental states. Wittgenstein does not directly say this, but implies it when he says: "One plays patience by oneself"(248).
Wittgenstein's argument against private language works just as well against epiphenomenal qualia if we consider it as an inclusive sensation term. A neo-Wittgenstein argument will consider that epiphenomenal qualia is a collective term for sensations. It would then deconstruct it in the same way as I have described previously; reaching the conclusion that although epiphenomenal qualia are private, they are discussed in a public language and therefore do not constitute a private language. As I have said, the analogy is imperfect, but this relevant because it is a new materialist reply against qualia.
VII
Wittgenstein effectively removes the foundation stone of the old Seventeenth and Eighteenth century models of language, at the same time rejecting the idea of private language as being inconsequential with the thesis: that the meaning of a sensation is not a private object the term picks out. This thesis eliminates the relevance of having private language by removing the meaning of sensation terms from private objects that the term represents. What does represent the meaning of the sensation term is a gestalt of private and public understanding of the sensation the term represents. Wittgenstein shows that all private language arguments fail because the meaning of their terms need to be fixed in a public language. This is the strongest argument for the thesis. The main objection to the thesis is that we look to our private sensations to understand the meaning of public sensation terms. Wittgenstein, however, shows us that our understanding of these sensation terms is based on a public consensus on their meaning. The thesis indirectly rejects the qualia objection to the materialist view of consciousness in contemporary philosophy of mind by asserting that, as a private language is non-functional, qualia is non-functional because they are not relevant to the physical world. We may have them, but they don't do anything relevant. "So", Wittgenstein says, "in the end when one is doing philosophy one gets to the point where one would like to just emit an inarticulate sound"(261).
Bibliography
* Brown, Derek. PHIL 311 Lectures 1995
* Dennett, Daniel. Consciousness Explained. (Penguin; Auckland, 1991).
* Jackson, Frank. Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly. 1982. (127-136).
* Proudfoot, Diane. PHIL 311 Lectures 1995
* Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. (Oxford; Blackwell, 1992). (paras: 243-308).
posted by oga at
11:16 AM
